



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 June 1965

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
The Department of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your request of 27 May, the intelligence community has prepared, and I transmit herewith Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-6-65, which discusses probable Communist reactions to the employment of B-52s in attacks on SAM sites and the jet aircraft deployed at airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Also enclosed are two related estimates: SNIE 10-6/1-65, which discusses Communist and non-Communist reactions to possible B-52 strikes on enemy positions within North Vietnam, and SNIE 10-7-65, which discusses probable Communist reactions should the US decide not to attack the SAMs and jet aircraft on the airfields mentioned above.

These three papers have been approved by the members of the United States Intelligence Board, though the State Department member dissenters from paragraph 8 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, from paragraphs 4 and 12 of SNIE 10-6-65.

We are of course keeping under constant review the evidence concerning the support furnished to the DRV by the USSR and Communist China, the conclusions that these actions suggest as to Communist capabilities and intentions, and the implications of all that for US policy.

Respectfully,
W. F. Harbo

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